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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 At issue is whether the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
can deepen the main channel of the Delaware River by five 
feet, enabling river ports to be economically competitive and 
at the same time, comply with statutes that protect the 
environment. The roots of the project trace back decades. In 
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1992, Congress authorized the project and appropriated $195 
million. It continued to support the effort with regular 
appropriations for the next twenty years.1
                                                 
1 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 111-278, at 50 (2009) (Conf. Rep.) 
(appropriating $4.8 million to the deepening project in the 
Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act of 2010); H.R. Rep. No. 109-275, at 73 
(2005) (Conf. Rep.) (approving $2.25 million to the project in 
the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 
2006). In 1999 and 2000, Congress also supported the project 
by extending credit to non-federal entities for costs related to 
design, construction, and disposal. See Water Resources 
Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-541, § 306, 114 
Stat. 2572 (2000) (“The project for navigation, Delaware 
River Mainstem and Channel Deepening . . . is further 
modified to authorize the Secretary to credit toward the non-
Federal share of the cost of the project . . . the costs incurred 
by the non-Federal interests in providing additional capacity 
at dredged material disposal areas . . .”); Water Resources 
Development Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-53, § 308, 113 
Stat. 269  (1999) (same).  Most recently, the U.S. House of 
Representatives approved $29.45 million for fiscal year 2013. 
See H.R. Rep. No. 112-462, at 29 (2010). 
 Commencement 
was delayed for several reasons, but in the fall of 2009, the 
Corps was ready to proceed. In October 2009, New Jersey 
and Delaware filed suits in the District Courts of New Jersey 
and Delaware to enjoin the Corps from dredging the deeper 
channel. They alleged violations of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the Clean Water Act 
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(“CWA”), and the Coastal Zone Management Act 
(“CZMA”). Each District Court granted summary judgment 
to the Corps, holding no environmental statutes would be 
breached. We will affirm. 
I. 
A.  
The federal government has maintained navigation in 
the Delaware River for over one hundred years. The initial 
project, “Philadelphia to the Sea,” was authorized by 
Congress in 1910 and ensures a navigation channel of 40-foot 
depth between Allegheny Avenue, Philadelphia, and a deep 
water point in the Delaware Bay, near Ship John Light. It 
requires the Corps to dredge 3.45 million cubic yards of 
material annually and to deposit the sediment at nearby 
locations, either owned or leased by the federal government. 
In 2009, the Corps used seven confined sites and one open-
water site for disposal.   
The deepening project dates to 1954, when the Senate 
Committee on Public Works, by resolution, requested the 
Corps to study “the Delaware River between Philadelphia and 
the sea, for the purpose of identifying the need for any 
modification to the existing channel dimensions and 
anchorage areas.”  In 1970, the House Committee on Public 
Works also instructed the Corps to analyze commerce along 
the Delaware River and to identify projects that would 
promote development of its ports. Pursuant to these 
directives, the Corps made extensive studies during the 1970s 
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and 1980s. In 1992, it published a Feasibility Report and 
Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”), recommending a 
deepening of five feet along the “main stem” of the Delaware 
River, the 102-mile stretch between the mouth of the 
Delaware Bay and the Philadelphia and Camden harbors.  
The Environmental Impact Statement predicted the 
deepening project would yield substantial economic benefits 
in the form of reduced costs to shippers. The main stem of the 
river hosts a concentration of heavy industry, as well as the 
second largest complex of oil refineries and petrochemical 
plants in the nation. But, as the EIS observed, “current 
authorized channel dimensions . . . present a constraint to 
efficient vessel movement.” The report determined that 
deepening the main navigation channel by five feet would 
benefit oil tankers, dry bulk shippers, and other large vessels, 
because it would enable them to service Delaware River ports 
without needing to “lighter” (transfer a portion of their cargo 
in the lower Delaware Bay) or “light load” (travel at under-
capacity). While the EIS identified potential adverse impacts 
to water quality, benthic organisms, and fishery resources, it 
concluded these would be minimal and were outweighed by 
the project’s benefits. Altogether, it forecast that construction 
and maintenance of a 5-foot deeper channel for five years 
would require the Corps to dredge 375 million cubic yards of 
material above the dredging associated with the Philadelphia 
to the Sea project.  
In June 1992, the Corps submitted the Environmental 
Impact Statement to Congress. That October, Congress 
passed the Water Resources Development Act, authorizing 
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the deepening project to go forward. See Water Resources 
Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-580, § 101(6), 
106 Stat. 4797 (“WRDA”).  Congress estimated the project 
would cost a total of approximately $295 million, with $195 
million to be borne by the federal government. Id. In 
December 1992, the Corps issued a Record of Decision 
stating the deepening project was “economically justified, in 
accordance with environmental statutes, and in the public 
interest.” Not only would “transportation cost savings . . . 
outweigh any adverse effects,” but the project was preferable 
to all other alternative plans, including a “no action” 
alternative.  
After issuing the Record of Decision, the Corps 
initiated the Preconstruction, Engineering and Design 
(“PED”) phase of the project. It consulted federal and state 
agencies and outside experts, and conducted new 
environmental analyses. In 1997, the Corps published a 
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (“SEIS”). Its 
goals were first, to “provide additional information and 
environmental analysis to address environmental concerns 
raised during review of the 1992 [EIS]”; and second, to 
evaluate modifications to the deepening project that had been 
made since the EIS was published.2
                                                 
2 These modifications were primarily to the project’s disposal 
plan. In the EIS, the Corps assumed it would deposit the 
dredged sediment from the project at two existing and three 
new disposal sites. By 1997, the Corps planned to use four, 
rather than three, new disposal facilities. The Corps also 
embraced a proposal to store dredged material at four 
 Like the EIS, the SEIS 
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recommended the project proceed. At the same time, it 
reduced its estimate of the amount of material to be dredged 
over 50 years – for initial project construction and future 
maintenance – from 375 to 321 million cubic yards. Like the 
EIS, the SEIS concluded the project would yield considerable 
economic benefits at a minimal environmental cost. On 
December 18, 1998, the Corps issued a second Record of 
Decision stating it had “reviewed and evaluated documents 
concerning the proposed action, including additional PED 
phase studies,” and it concluded “[t]he public interest will 
best be served by implementing the improvements identified 
and described in the Feasibility Report and the Supplemental 
Environmental Impact Statement.” The Record of Decision 
reiterated that “[a]ll practical means to avoid or minimize 
adverse environmental effects have been incorporated into the 
recommended plan.”  
 For the next eleven years, progress on the deepening 
project stalled. One reason for the delay was that in the mid-
2000s, the Delaware River Port Authority (“DRPA”) 
withdrew the support it had tendered in 1999, leaving the 
Corps without a local partner.3
                                                                                                             
“beneficial use” sites in Delaware and New Jersey – at Kelly 
Island, DE, for wetlands restoration; at Egg Point Island, NJ, 
also for wetlands restoration; and at Broadkill and Slaughter 
Beaches, DE, for beach nourishment. The sand for Broadkill 
Beach would first be stockpiled elsewhere.  
 In June 2008, the Philadelphia 
3 The bi-state board of the DRPA came to stalemate at its 
meeting in December 2005, when the New Jersey 
commissioners on the board refused to endorse the deepening 
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River Port Authority (“PRPA”) came forward and signed a 
partnership agreement with the Corps. The agencies agreed to 
share costs: 75% for the Corps, 25% for PRPA. 
By late 2008, the Corps was ready to commence 
dredging the deeper channel. But over a decade had passed 
since the SEIS was published, and there were new 
developments. First, improved survey technology meant the 
deepening could be deployed more efficiently, reducing the 
amount of sediment. The total estimated dredging for the 
project over a 50-year period was reduced again, from 321 to 
232 million cubic yards. Accordingly, the updated disposal 
plan called for using only existing, federally-owned sites – 
the four new disposal sites included in the SEIS were no 
longer necessary. Second, the construction plan now called 
for dredged sand from the Delaware Bay to be deposited 
                                                                                                             
project and Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell, Chairman of 
the DRPA, refused to adopt the agency’s budget until the 
project was approved. See Geoff Mulvihill, Dredging Spat 
Deepens Between Two Neighbors, Associated Press, Dec. 31, 
2005.  For the next 18 months, the meetings of the DRPA 
were suspended. In May 2007, the two states finally reached a 
deal: DRPA would return the $38.5 million set aside for the 
project to Pennsylvania and New Jersey, half-and-half; DRPA 
would hand jurisdiction over the project to the Philadelphia 
River Port Authority (“PRPA”); Pennsylvania would proceed 
in collaboration with PRPA; and New Jersey would use its 
share of the returned money for local improvement projects. 
See Deborah Yao, Pa., N.J. Finally Agree on Delaware River 
Dredging Project, Associated Press, May 18, 2007. 
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directly onto Broadkill Beach, DE, rather than temporarily 
stockpiled offshore. Third, the reduction in the amount of 
predicted dredged material meant a wetlands restoration 
project at Egg Point Island, NJ, would be deferred. Finally, 
there were two environmental changes since 1997. An oil 
spill from the T/S Athos I in November 2004 had released 
265,000 gallons of oil into the Delaware River, temporarily 
increasing the toxicity of the river’s sediments. Also, recent 
surveys predicted an expansion in the number and distribution 
of shortnose sturgeon in the Delaware River, potentially 
increasing the risk that rock blasting in the Marcus Hook 
region could cause the species.  
The Corps released a public notice on December 17, 
2008, announcing it was undertaking a new “environmental 
review.” The notice stated: 
Notice is hereby given that the Philadelphia 
District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, is 
conducting an environmental review of all 
applicable, existing and new information 
generated subsequent to the Supplemental 
Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) of 
1997 prepared for the Delaware River Main 
Stem and Channel Project . . . . At present, the 
Philadelphia District has found no factors 
precluding the Project from moving forward 
based on previous studies. A summary of 
project changes and environmental changes 
known to date is attached. The public and all 
agencies are invited to comment on the attached 
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changes, and to identify any applicable existing 
and new information generated subsequent to 
the 1997 SEIS by responding to this Public 
Notice. A copy of the SEIS of 1997 and other 
environmental studies performed since the 
completion of the SEIS, are among the 
information available on the District’s website. 
The environmental review referenced above 
will be used to update the environmental record, 
and to determine whether further environmental 
work and analyses are needed.4
On April 3, 2009, the Corps published an 
Environmental Assessment (“EA”). The report’s central 
conclusion was that no additional environmental impact 
statement was necessary. None of the developments since 
1997 – the elimination of the four new disposal sites, the plan 
for direct stockpiling at Broadkill Beach, the deferment of 
wetlands restoration at Egg Point Island, and the possible 
changes to the natural environment – had materially altered 
the project’s environmental risk profile. Thus, the EA closed 
with a signed declaration by the Commander of the Corps’ 
Philadelphia District, stating: 
 
Based on the information contained in this EA . 
. . 1) none of the changes to the proposed 
project are “substantial”; and 2) there are no 
                                                 
4 The Corps provided the public four weeks for comments 
(initially, two weeks were provided but the Corps lengthened 
this in response to requests for more time).  
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new circumstances that can be considered 
“significant.” Therefore, I have determined that 
the threshold for preparation of a Supplemental 
Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) . . . has 
not been met and that changes to the project or 
project conditions since the 1997 SEIS will not 
have a significant adverse effect on the human 
environment. 
Like the Environmental Impact Statement and Supplemental 
Environmental Impact Statement, the Environmental 
Assessment recommended the project proceed because its 
substantial economic benefits outweighed any possible 
adverse environmental effects.5
                                                 
5 The 2009 EA described the economic benefits of the 
deepening project as follows: 
  On April 8, 2009, the Corps 
 The NED [National Economic 
Development] benefits quantified include the 
reduced costs of transportation realized through 
operational efficiencies (reduced lightering and 
lightloading), and the use of larger more 
efficient vessels, both resulting from navigation 
improvements at the harbor. Reduced 
transportation costs result in reduced production 
and distribution costs and thereby increase the 
net value of the national output of goods and 
services. 
 Benefits will result from the decrease in 
the cost per ton for shipping commodities into 
or out of the Delaware River Port System. The 
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transmitted the 1997 Supplemental Environmental Impact 
Statement and 2009 Environmental Assessment to the chairs 
of the Senate and House Subcommittees on Energy and Water 
Development in the Committees on Appropriations.  
 When Congress first authorized the deepening project 
in 1992, the Corps initiated a comprehensive process of 
discussion, coordination, and collaboration with New Jersey 
and Delaware to obtain the state authorizations mandated by 
various environmental statutes. Two statutes are relevant to 
this appeal. First, the Coastal Zone Management Act 
                                                                                                             
45 foot channel depth will improve the 
economic efficiency of ships moving through 
the Delaware River ports. No induced tonnage 
(i.e., commodity shifts from other ports) will 
take place with the proposed project deepening. 
The largest vessels in the port fleet, crude oil 
tankers, currently lighter at Big Stone 
Anchorage in the naturally deep water of the 
lower Delaware Bay. These vessels will 
continue to carry the same tonnage from foreign 
origin ports but will be able to operate more 
efficiently in the Delaware River with a 
deepened channel from reduced lightering. This 
will also result in a reduction in barge traffic 
needed to move the lightered crude oil upriver 
to the refineries. Also, a deeper channel depth 
will allow current dry  bulk and container 
vessels to carry more cargo as well as allow a 
fleet shift in the charter dry bulk market. 
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obligates the Corps to submit a “consistency determination” 
to any state whose “coastal zone” will be affected by one of 
its activities. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(A), (C).  The 
consistency determination describes how the Corps will 
deploy the project “in a manner which is consistent to the 
maximum extent practicable” with the state’s program for 
managing coastal areas. Id. If the Corps receives a 
“concurrence,” it may proceed; if it does not, it can proceed 
over the state’s objection in limited circumstances. 15 C.F.R. 
§§ 930.41(a)-(d), 930.43(d). Second, the Clean Water Act 
requires the Corps to comply with all state laws “respecting 
the control and abatement of water pollution.” 33 U.S.C. § 
1323(a).  The Corps must obtain a state “water certification” 
when, on the basis of a federally-issued permit, it plans to 
discharge pollutants into a state’s navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1341(a).  
To comply with the CZMA, the Corps submitted 
“consistency determinations” to the Delaware Department of 
Natural Resources and Environmental Control (“DNREC”) 
and the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 
(“NJDEP”) in 1996. Delaware identified several concerns, but 
provided a concurrence on May 1, 1997. New Jersey signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Corps on August 29, 
1997, and on the same day, provided a concurrence. 
Accordingly, both CZMA clearances were in place in 1997. 
But each state retreated. New Jersey attempted to “revoke” its 
CZMA concurrence in September 2002, and requested 
supplemental filings from the Corps in 2008 and again in 
2009. Delaware issued an order requiring the Corps to submit 
a new consistency determination in 2009, contending 
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“substantial project modifications” had rendered its 1997 
concurrence outdated.  
The Corps did not provide supplemental consistency 
determinations to New Jersey or Delaware. Rather, on 
November 9, 2009, it issued a Memorandum of Record 
concluding that no additional coordination was necessary for 
the Corps to comply with the CZMA. The Corps referred to 
the April 2009 EA, which had found that no substantial 
changes to the project had been made and no significant new 
information about the project’s consequences had surfaced 
since the 1997 SEIS. Because concurrences from each state 
had been in place at that point in time, and because the 
project’s risk profile had not changed, it was not necessary to 
provide supplemental consistency determinations.  
On January 19, 2001, the Corps initiated coordination 
with Delaware to comply with the Clean Water Act; that is, it 
applied to the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and 
Environmental Control for a water quality “certification” as 
well as for Subaqueous Lands and Wetlands permits. See 7 
Del. Code chs. 60, 66 & 72.  These efforts were unsuccessful. 
Significantly, Delaware took no action on the Corps’ 
application for the next eight years.6
                                                 
6 DNREC did hold hearings on the Corps’ application in 
December 2001, soliciting public comments and hiring an 
independent consultant to serve as a Hearing Officer. In 2003, 
the Hearing Officer published a report recommending that 
Delaware deny the application. But DNREC did not act on 
the recommendation for the next five years.  
 On December 30, 2008, 
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it filed a comment in response to the public notice issued by 
the Corps on December 17, stating it would review any new 
information on the project “in the context of a new Delaware 
subaqueous lands and wetlands permit application.” The 
implication was that Delaware had denied, by inaction, the 
prior requests for Subaqueous Lands and Wetlands permits 
and was now requesting a new application.7
The record does not indicate whether the Corps 
applied for a water quality certification from New Jersey to 
comply with the Clean Water Act. But neither party disputes 
that to date, the Corps has not obtained such a certification 
from New Jersey.  
 On July 23, 
2009, eight and a half years after the Corps filed its 
application, Delaware made its denial of the 2001 application 
official by order of the Secretary of DNREC.  
Despite these roadblocks, the Corps issued a 
Memorandum of Record on April 30, 2009, invoking its 
authority to “maintain navigation” under Section 404(t) of the 
Clean Water Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(t). This authority, the 
Corps contends, relieved it of any further obligation to obtain 
Subaqueous Lands and Wetlands permits from Delaware. The 
Corps drew additional authority from Section 404(r) of the 
CWA, which provides a special waiver for projects that are 
congressionally authorized. Id. § 1344(r). It contends Section 
404(r) obviated the need to obtain water quality certifications 
from Delaware or New Jersey. 
                                                 
7 Delaware’s letter did not directly mention the issue of the 
water quality certification.  
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By late 2009, the Corps believed it had complied with 
all statutory mandates and could begin dredging the deeper 
channel. Under NEPA, it had published an Environmental 
Assessment in April 2009, concluding the project was in the 
public interest and that no additional environmental impact 
statements were necessary. Under the CZMA, it had 
submitted consistency determinations to New Jersey and 
Delaware in 1996, obtained concurrences within a year, and 
issued a Memorandum of Record announcing no additional 
CZMA coordination was necessary. Under the Clean Water 
Act, it had issued a separate Memorandum of Record in April 
2009, invoking Section 404(t) of the Act to overcome the 
need for the special Delaware permits, and believed it could 
otherwise rely on the Section 404(r) exemption to circumvent 
the water quality certifications. In October 2009, the Corps 
entered into a contract with PRPA which authorized it to 
initiate the project at “Reach C,” a 12-mile stretch spanning 
from the Delaware Memorial Bridge to the C&D Canal. The 
contract did not authorize the Corps to deepen any other 
portion of the river until December 2010.  
B. 
On October 30, 2009 and November 2, 2009, the 
Delaware Department of Natural Resources and 
Environmental Control and the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection initiated actions in the District 
Courts of Delaware and New Jersey to prevent the Corps 
from commencing dredging of the deeper channel.  In the 
Delaware action, DNREC sued under the Clean Water Act, 
Clean Air Act, Coastal Zone Management Act, and the 
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Delaware Code, requesting the court enjoin the Corps until it 
obtained the authorizations and concurrences from Delaware 
specified by those statutes. Delaware Riverkeeper Network 
(“Riverkeeper”) intervened as a plaintiff, and PRPA as a 
defendant. On January 29, 2010, the District Court granted in 
part and denied in part Delaware’s request. It preliminarily 
enjoined the project at Reaches A, B, D, and E, but allowed 
the Corps to commence at Reach C.8
                                                 
8 The reasoning for the District Court’s ruling was as follows. 
At a hearing in December 2009, the Corps claimed 
construction at Reach C was slated to begin imminently, but 
subsequent phases would not commence until December 
2010. Meanwhile, despite its delay, DNREC had represented 
that it was prepared to complete its administrative review of 
the Corps’ application for the various state authorizations 
within a year. The District Court reasoned that while the 
Corps was likely to prevail on its claim that all federal 
statutes had been complied with,  and so construction at 
Reach C should commence, there was no harm in enjoining 
the remainder of the project to enable DNREC to provide its 
decisions on the Corps’ application. Given that future phases 
of the project were not slated to begin for a year anyway, and 
that DNREC claimed it would complete its review within that 
time, the partial injunction would facilitate federal-state 
coordination while not compromising the Corps’ interests.  
  The parties filed and 
cross-filed motions for summary judgment, and on December 
7, 2010, the District Court dissolved its partial injunction and 
granted summary judgment to the Corps and PRPA. It held 
the Corps had properly invoked its authority to “maintain 
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navigation” under Section 404(t) of the CWA, and this made 
all the difference. It held: “Having determined that the 
navigation exception . . . is applicable here . . . the Corps is 
exempt from compliance with the CWA, CZMA, and CAA, 
and judgment must be entered in its favor.”  
In the New Jersey action, NJDEP sought relief under 
NEPA, the CWA, the CZMA, the Clean Air Act, the Fish & 
Wildlife Coordination Act, the Water Resources 
Development Act, and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act. NJDEP asked the court 
to enjoin the Corps until it had “comprehensively sample[d] 
and analyze[d] the sediment within the areas to be dredged,” 
issued a new SEIS, obtained a water quality certificate from 
New Jersey, and completed its supplemental coordination 
under the CZMA. Riverkeeper again intervened as a plaintiff, 
and PRPA again intervened as a defendant.  The parties filed 
and cross-filed motions for summary judgment and on 
January 13, 2011, the court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the Corps and PRPA.  The court held the Corps had 
complied with NEPA when it issued the 2009 EA, complied 
with the CZMA when it declined to provide a supplemental 
consistency determination, and was relieved of its obligations 
under the CWA because Congress authorized the project in 
1992.  Riverkeeper and New Jersey appealed both judgments 
under NEPA, the CZMA, and the CWA, and we consolidated 
their cases for review. Delaware did not file an appeal.  
As this litigation unfolded, the Corps made headway 
on the project. After receiving court approval in January 
2010, it commenced dredging at “Reach C” and completed 
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that segment in September 2010.  In November 2011, the 
Corps began deepening the 4-mile stretch known as “Lower 
Reach B,” which extends from Oldsman Creek to the 
Delaware Memorial Bridge. That segment is now also 
complete. See Delaware River Main Channel Deepening 
Project: Construction Status, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
Philadelphia District, http://www.nap.usace.army.mil/cenap-
pl/drmcdp/drcs.htm (last updated Jan. 20, 2012); Jon Hurdle, 
New Federal Funding May Move Delaware River Channel-




We review grants of summary judgment de novo. 
Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, the 
discovery, the disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits 
show that there is no “genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  Because appellants challenge the 
actions of a federal agency (the Corps) in its application of 
federal law (NEPA, the CWA, the CZMA, and corresponding 
regulations), our standard of review is informed by 
administrative law doctrines prescribing the degree of 
 
                                                 
9 Appellants’ causes of action arise under federal law. 
Accordingly, the Delaware and New Jersey District Courts 
had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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deference a reviewing court should apply to agency conduct. 
We elaborate further on the amount of deference due for each 
of the statutory challenges. 
III.  
New Jersey and Riverkeeper contend the Corps’ 
decision to proceed with the project in 2009 ran afoul of 
NEPA procedurally and substantively. As for procedures, 
appellants contend the publication of the EA was arbitrary 
and capricious because the Corps failed to comply with the 
regulations governing the preparation of NEPA studies. As 
for substance, appellants contend the EA fell short of the 
“hard look” demanded by NEPA on whether an SEIS was 
necessary. As explained below, we find all NEPA claims 
unavailing.  
A. 
Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.), to further two goals: ensure federal 
agencies consider the environmental consequences of projects 
before committing resources; and facilitate agencies’ 
communication with the public about their environmental 
analyses. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 
U.S. 332, 350-52 (1989). NEPA is a procedural statute. Its 
goal is to “prohibi[t] uninformed – rather than unwise – 
agency action.” N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm’n, 561 F.3d 132, 134 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). NEPA also 
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created the Council of Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) within 
the Executive Office of the President, granting it authority to 
issue regulations effectuating NEPA. CEQ regulations are 
“mandatory” for all federal agencies, carry the force of law, 
and are entitled to “substantial deference.” See Marsh v. Or. 
Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 372 (1989); Andrus v. 
Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979). In addition to CEQ 
regulations, agencies are bound by whatever regulations they 
promulgate under NEPA. E.g., 33 C.F.R. § 230 et seq. (U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers’ regulations). 
NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare 
environmental impact statements before undertaking “major 
[f]ederal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).10
                                                 
10 In full, NEPA provides: 
  To comply, an 
[A]ll agencies of the Federal Government shall . 
. . include in every recommendation or report on 
proposals for legislation and other major 
Federal actions significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment, a detailed 
statement by the responsible official on – (i) the 
environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which 
cannot be avoided should the proposal be 
implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed 
action, (iv) the relationship between local short-
term uses of man’s environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term 
productivity, and (v) any irreversible and 
26 
 
agency must first decide whether a contemplated project 
qualifies as a “major federal action significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment.” CEQ regulations instruct 
the agency to consider both the “context” and “intensity” of 
the action to determine if its environmental effects will be 
“significant.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(a)-(b). If the project 
qualifies, the agency should assess whether it is of a type that 
“[n]ormally requires an environmental impact assessment” or 
“[n]ormally does not require either an environmental impact 
statement or environmental assessment (categorical 
exclusion).” Id. § 1501.4(a)(1)-(2).  If the action normally 
requires an impact statement, the agency should prepare one. 
If it normally requires neither an impact statement nor an 
assessment, the agency can proceed with the project. In all 
remaining situations, the agency should “prepare an 
environmental assessment” for the action. Id. § 1501.4(b). An 
EA is a “concise public document” that “[b]riefly provide[s] 
sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to 
prepare an [EIS].” Id. § 1508.9(a). If the agency concludes on 
the basis of the EA that no environmental impact statement is 
needed, it must issue a Finding of No Significant Impact 
(“FONSI”). Id. § 1501.4(e).   
Agencies must update – or “supplement” – their 
environmental impact statements over time to ensure they are 
                                                                                                             
irretrievable commitments of resources which 
would be involved in the proposed action 
should it be implemented. 




current. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 370-74. CEQ regulations instruct 
agencies to “prepare supplements to either draft or final 
environmental impact statements” in two situations: (1) if 
“[t]he agency makes substantial changes in the proposed 
action that are relevant to environmental concerns,” or (2) if 
“[t]here are significant new circumstances or information 
relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the 
proposed action or its impacts.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1); see 
also 33 C.F.R. § 230.13(b) (requiring the Corps to 
supplement an EIS “whenever required as discussed in 40 
CFR 1502.09(c)”). The Supreme Court has elaborated that an 
agency must take a “hard look” in assessing whether either of 
the Section 1502.9(c) scenarios is present. Norton v. S. Utah 
Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 72-73 (2004). 
Understandably, neither NEPA nor CEQ regulations 
prescribes particular proceedings agencies should use in 
carrying out this “hard look.” In re Operation of Mo. River 
Sys. Litig., 516 F.3d 688, 695 (8th Cir. 2008).11
                                                 
11 For instance, there is no requirement that the agency use an 
EA to determine if a supplemental EIS is needed. In Marsh, 
the Supreme Court upheld a decision by the Corps not to 
issue a supplemental EIS when the agency had used a 
Supplemental Information Report (“SIR”) rather than an EA 
to assess new information. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 385 (holding 
“the Corps acted within the dictates of NEPA in concluding 
that supplementation was unnecessary” when its SIR found 





Judicial review of agency conduct under NEPA is 
deferential. The sole question on review is whether the 
agency’s actions were arbitrary or capricious. See 5 U.S.C. § 
706(2)(A). When an agency publishes an EA and concludes 
an EIS is not needed, courts set those determinations aside 
only if there is evidence they were arbitrary or capricious. See 
Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 763 (2004) 
(“An agency’s decision not to prepare an EIS can be set aside 
only upon a showing that it was ‘arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.’” (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)); Soc’y Hill Towers 
Owners’ Ass’n v. Rendell, 210 F.3d 168, 180 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Similarly, arbitrary and capricious review attaches to an 
agency decision not to supplement an EIS. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 
375-76 (“We conclude that review of the narrow question . . . 
whether the Corps’ determination that the FEISS need not be 
supplemented should be set aside is controlled by the 
‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard of § 706(2)(A).”).  
If some years pass between an agency’s completion of 
an EIS and its commencement of a project, a supplemental 
EIS may be indicated.  But in Marsh, the Court made clear 
that judicial review of agency conduct in such situations is 
“narrow,” as is generally the case with arbitrary and 
capricious review. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378. An agency’s 
decision not to supplement an EIS “is a classic example of a 
factual dispute the resolution of which implicates substantial 
agency expertise.” Id. at 376. Thus, the standard is still 
whether the action evidences arbitrary or capricious decision-
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making. See Town of Winthrop v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 535 
F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2008) (upholding the FAA’s decision in 
2007 not to supplement an EIS from 2002); Ark. Wildlife 
Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 431 F.3d 1096, 1103-04 
(8th Cir. 2005) (upholding the Corps’ decision in 2004, after 
conducting an EA, not to supplement an EIS from 1999); 
Price Road Neighborhood Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Transp., 113 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding the 
Federal Highway Administration’s determination that a 
project change did not require a new EA).12
                                                 
12 In South Trenton Residents Against 29 v. Federal Highway 
Administration, 176 F.3d 658, 663 (3d Cir. 1999),  we 
“assume[d] . . . an agency’s determination not to revise an 
Environmental Impact Statement must be ‘reasonable under 
the circumstances.’” (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted; alteration in original).  But Marsh unquestionably 
held that review in such contexts is for arbitrary or capricious 
action. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 375-76 (“The parties disagree . . . 
on the standard that should be applied by a court that is asked 
to review the agency’s decision. Petitioners argue that the 
reviewing court need only decide whether the agency 
decision was ‘arbitrary and capricious,’ whereas respondents 
argue that the reviewing court must make its own 
determination of reasonableness to ascertain whether the 
agency action complied with the law. In determining the 
proper standard of review, we look to § 10(e) of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706 . . . . 
We conclude that review of the narrow question before us 





  In our review of the Corps’ conduct, we conclude that 
its publication of the 2009 EA was neither arbitrary nor 
capricious. 
1. 
The Corps complied with the procedural requirements 
prescribed by NEPA and its corresponding regulations 
because it engaged in a transparent and inclusive process, 
soliciting the views of federal and state agencies as well as of 
members of the public, and published an exhaustive, 179-
page Environmental Assessment that reviewed the project’s 
risks, responded to concerns raised, and came to the 
reasonable conclusion the project should proceed. 
Neither CEQ nor Corps regulations detail the process 
an agency should follow when publishing an environmental 
assessment. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (CEQ 
regulations defining EAs); 33 C.F.R. § 230.10 (Corps 
regulations defining EAs). There are no notice requirements, 
pre-circulation requirements, or instructions about the public 
comments process. CEQ regulations only provide that 
agencies “shall involve . . . the public, to the extent 
practicable, in preparing [environmental] assessments[.]” 40 
C.F.R. § 1501.4(b). This is different in the case of 
environmental impact statements, for which CEQ and Corps 
                                                                                                             
supplemented should be set aside is controlled by the 




The Corps’ procedures in preparing and publishing the 
2009 EA satisfied Section 1501.4(b)’s directive to “involve . . 
. the public to the extent practicable.” On December 17, 2008, 
the agency published a notice stating it was undertaking an 
“environmental review” in order “to update the environmental 
record, and to determine whether further environmental work 
and analyses are needed.” The Corps provided a summary of 
changes to the project that had been made since 1997 and 
links to the SEIS, EIS, and reports by other federal agencies. 
Collectively, the notice and appended materials 
communicated to the public that the Corps was undertaking a 
new environmental study of the deepening project and that its 
goal was to determine whether “further environmental work,” 
 See Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. 
Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257, 1279 (10th Cir. 2004) (“NEPA’s 
public involvement requirements are not as well defined 
when an agency prepares only an EA and not an EIS.”). 
                                                 
13 CEQ regulations mandate that agencies “publish a notice of 
intent in the Federal Register” at the earliest “practicable” 
moment regarding the preparation of an environmental impact 
statement, 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7; disseminate a copy of the draft 
or final EIS for public review before taking further action, id. 
§ 1506.10(b)(1), (2); “[r]equest comments [on the EIS] from 
the public, affirmatively soliciting comments from those 
persons or organizations who may be interested or affected,” 
id. § 1503.1(a)(4); and “respond by one or more of the means 
listed below” to the comments received, id. § 1503.4(a). See 
also 33 C.F.R. §§ 230.19, App. C ¶¶ 1-2 (regulations 
governing draft and final EIS reports). 
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such as a new SEIS, was needed. It directly provided the 
public with access to the information it would rely upon and 
solicited comments.  The 30-day comment period was equal 
to the length of time mandated by CEQ regulations for 
comment periods for final EIS studies. 40 C.F.R. § 
1506.10(b)(2).  The Corps was transparent, clear, and 
inclusive. 
After soliciting and reviewing the public comments, 
the Corps published a thorough, 179-page Environmental 
Assessment on April 3, 2009. The report addressed the 
substance of the most important issues raised in the comments 
– questions about sediment quality, water quality, air quality, 
biological resources, and the impacts of the Athos oil spill. 
Each environmental risk, the report concluded, was minimal 
and could be mitigated through appropriate implementation 
measures. The Corps also responded in great detail to a 
comment filed by the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection on January 14, 2009, sending the 
agency a letter on April 24, 2009 that reiterated the findings 
of the EA and expounded on its conclusions.  
Despite the Corps’ comprehensive public engagement, 
appellants contend it acted arbitrarily and capriciously under 
NEPA. They argue the Corps provided inadequate public 
notice; erred in declining to publish a FONSI alongside the 
EA; erred in not circulating a draft of the EA for public 
review before publication; and did not meaningfully review 
the comments submitted. None of these claims has merit.  
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Regarding public notice, appellants contend the Corps 
did not specify the form of its forthcoming “review,” i.e., that 
it would be an Environmental Assessment, and that the 
comment period fell during a time of year when many people 
are on vacation. But as explained, neither NEPA nor its 
corresponding regulations impose a public notice requirement 
for EAs. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9; 33 C.F.R. § 
230.10. The CEQ regulations only direct that agencies 
“involve . . . the public, to the extent practicable.” 40 C.F.R. § 
1501.4(b). The December 17, 2008 notice satisfied this 
mandate by describing a forthcoming “environmental review” 
that would be “used to update the environmental record, and 
to determine whether further environmental work and 
analyses are needed.” Furthermore, the Corps appended a 
wealth of materials to its notice to make evident the 
information it would rely upon and to solicit feedback on that 
information. Courts have upheld EAs preceded by public 
notices with the same or with considerably less detail than 
that here. E.g., Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. 
Salazar, 616 F.3d 497, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (involving a 
public notice that did not “suppl[y] any specific 
environmental information”); Bering Strait Citizens for 
Responsible Res. Dev. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 524 
F.3d 938, 952-53 (9th Cir. 2008) (involving a notice that did 
not specify an EA was being prepared); Alliance To Protect 
Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 398 F.3d 105, 
108, 115 (1st Cir. 2005) (involving a notice that did not 
mention a forthcoming EA).  
 Second, appellants fault the Corps for publishing the 
EA without issuing a Finding of No Significant Impact. But 
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neither CEQ nor Corps regulations impose a FONSI 
requirement in this context – an agency deciding, on the basis 
of an EA, whether to issue a supplemental EIS. The 
regulations require FONSIs only when the agency employs an 
EA to decide whether to issue an initial EIS. See 40 C.F.R. § 
1501.4(e) (instructing agencies to prepare “a finding of no 
significant impact (§ 1508.13) if the agency determines on the 
basis of an environmental assessment not to prepare a[n 
environmental impact] statement”); 33 C.F.R. § 230.11 (“A 
FONSI shall be prepared for a proposed action, not 
categorically excluded, for which an EIS will not be 
prepared.”). Given that CEQ and Corps regulations authorize 
the use of EAs for a wide array of purposes, see 40 C.F.R. § 
1501.3(b) (“Agencies may prepare an environmental 
assessment on any action at any time in order to assist agency 
planning and decisionmaking.”); 33 C.F.R. § 230.10(c), their 
silence on FONSIs for all but the initial EIS-determination is 
instructive. The Corps was not required to issue a FONSI, and 
its decision to refrain from doing so was not arbitrary or 
capricious. See In re Operation of Mo. River Sys. Litig., 516 
F.3d at 695 (“[T]he Corps prepared an EA, not to help it 
decide whether to prepare an EIS, but rather to determine 
whether the change in agency action required an SEIS. As 
this case illustrates, it is reasonable to expect that the Corps 
will sometimes determine that a FONSI is not appropriate 
because the action being taken has a significant impact on the 
environment, but an SEIS is not required because the impact 
was sufficiently analyzed in an earlier FEIS [Final 
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Environmental Impact Statement]. This approach is neither a 
misuse of the EA procedure nor a violation of NEPA.”).14
                                                 
14 We recognize that the Corps’ General Counsel, Earl 
Stockdale, came to a different conclusion on the necessity of 
a FONSI. In an internal  memorandum prepared for the 
agency, he reasoned that “all EAs must result in either a 
FONSI or an EIS with no exception” and so “without 
preparing of a FONSI, the Corps will simply not have 
completed its required NEPA process.” This conclusion was 
incorrect. The sole regulatory provisions cited by Stockdale to 
support his analysis were 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e) and 33 C.F.R. 
§ 230.11. These provisions do require FONSIs, but only for 
the initial EIS determination. See supra.   
 
Nonetheless, even if the FONSI requirement under 
Section 1501.4(e) attached, the Corps complied with it. The 
last page of the EA contained a signed declaration by 
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Ticker, stating: “Based on the 
information contained in this EA and the referenced studies, I 
have concluded that . . . . the threshold for preparation of a 
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) set 
forth at 40 CFR 1502.9(c) has not been met and that changes 
to the project or project conditions since the 1997 SEIS will 
not have a significant adverse effect on the human 
environment.” It was neither arbitrary nor capricious for the 
Corps to assume this signed declaration operated as a FONSI. 
The CEQ regulations define a FONSI as “a document by a 
Federal agency briefly presenting the reasons why an action . 
. . will not have a significant effect on the human environment 
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 Third, appellants contend the Corps’ failure to 
circulate a draft of the EA before final publication was 
procedurally invalid. But neither CEQ nor Corps regulations 
impose a universal requirement to circulate draft EAs before 
publication. The CEQ regulations instruct that a document be 
disseminated for public review only when it is a draft or final 
EIS, 40 C.F.R. § 1506.10(b), or involves a “proposed action” 
that (i) would normally require an EIS which the agency has 
decided to forgo, or (ii) is “without precedent,” id. § 
1501.4(e)(2)(i), (ii).  The Corps’ regulations require that EAs 
be circulated before publication only when they concern 
“feasibility, continuing authority, or special planning reports 
and certain planning/engineering reports.” 33 C.F.R. § 
230.11. The EA for the deepening project did not fall into any 
of these categories.15
                                                                                                             
and for which an environmental impact statement therefore 
will not be prepared.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13. 
 See Bering Strait Citizens, 524 F.3d at 
15 The EA by definition was not a draft or final EIS, so was 
not covered by 40 C.F.R. § 1506.10(b). It also did not fall 
under either prong of 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e)(2) – it is not an 
action “which normally requires the preparation of an 
environmental impact statement” under § 1501.4(e)(2)(i), 
because Corps regulations provide an exclusive list of such 
actions at 33 C.F.R. §  230.6 and the project does not qualify; 
and it is not an action “without precedent” under § 
1501.4(e)(2)(ii), because the Corps has maintained dredging 
operations in the Delaware River since 1910.  Finally, the EA 
did not fall under 33 C.F.R. § 230.11. That section refers to 
reports produced by the Corps pursuant to specific regulatory 
37 
 
952 (“We hold today that the circulation of a draft EA is not 
required in every case. . . . Our conclusion is consistent with 
the views of other circuits, which uniformly have not insisted 
on the circulation of a draft EA.”); Fund for Animals, Inc. v. 
Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 549 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding there was 
“no legal requirement that an Environmental Assessment be 
circulated publicly and, in fact, they rarely are” (emphasis 
omitted)). Meanwhile, although some evidence in the record 
suggests the Corps often released EAs for public review 
before publication, this was a nonbinding internal practice 
from which the Corps had discretion to deviate. United States 
v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 754 n.18 (1979) (“[A]gencies are 
not required, at the risk of invalidation of their action, to 
follow all of their rules, even those properly classified as 
‘internal.’”). It exercised that discretion reasonably, given the 
long history of public involvement in reviewing and 
commenting on the deepening project, including the recent 
four-week comment period, and given the EA’s central 
conclusion that no factor or development altered the findings 
                                                                                                             
programs, none of which apply here. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 
263.10, 263.15, 263.19 (“Continuing Authorities Program”); 
id. § 230 App. A (“feasibility studies”); see also Procedures 
for Implementing the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA), 53 Fed. Reg. 3120, 3124 (Feb. 3. 1988) (explaining 
that 33 C.F.R. § 230.11 requires a “30 day review of the EA” 
for the “types of actions” specified in the rule, none of which 
include dredging activities). Appellants appear to concede 
that none of the provisions mandating EA pre-circulation 
apply here. N.J. Br. at 44-46; Riverkeeper Br. at 79-81. 
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of the earlier reports. E.g., Pogliani v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 306 F.3d 1235, 1240 (2d Cir. 2002) (refusing to grant 
a preliminary injunction based on the Corps’ decision not to 
circulate a draft EA because the action was not one which 
“normally requires” an EIS nor “without precedent” under 40 
C.F.R. § 1501.4(e)(2), and so did not have a pre-circulation 
requirement). 
 Finally, appellants contend the Corps failed to 
meaningfully consider the public comments it received on its 
December 17, 2008 notice.  But the 179-page Environmental 
Assessment comprehensively addressed the key issues raised 
in the comments. See supra.  Furthermore, the record 
demonstrates over twenty years of engagement by the Corps 
with the public, state governments, and other federal 
agencies. The Corps’ activity in the 2008-2009 period was the 
final chapter of this engagement. On May 4, 1989, the Corps 
issued a notice of intent to file a Draft Environmental Impact 
Statement on the deepening project. It circulated a copy of 
that report for public comment on July 13, 1990, and released 
a final EIS in February 1992, incorporating the comments 
received. The Corps repeated this public engagement process 
for the SEIS in 1997. Between 1992 and 2008, it had a steady 
stream of communications with the EPA, New Jersey, and 
Delaware about the project’s compliance with the Clean 
Water Act and the Coastal Zone Management Act. It also 
engaged in rigorous coordination with the National Marine 
Fisheries Service (“NMFS”), conducting an Endangered 
Species Act consultation in 1996 and preparing a Biological 
Assessment for the agency in 2009. Given this twenty-plus 
year period of public, inter-state, and inter-agency 
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involvement, the assertion that the Corps failed to engage the 
public or respond to its views lacks merit.16
2. 
 
NEPA not only requires that agencies follow certain 
                                                 
16 The record does not show the Corps’ decision to proceed 
with the project was “predetermined,” making the EA a sham 
review. See Riverkeeper Reply Br. at 22; NJ Reply Br. at 15. 
NEPA reviews “must be taken objectively and in good faith, 
not as an exercise in form over substance, and not as a 
subterfuge designed to rationalize a decision already made.” 
Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2000).  We 
will invalidate projects where the “agency has impermissibly 
committed itself to a course of action before embarking upon 
a NEPA analysis.” Forest Guardians v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Serv., 611 F.3d 692, 716 (10th Cir. 2010).  But there is no 
indication that the Corps “impermissibly committed itself” to 
the deepening project before completing the EA. It did not 
begin dredging or make an “irretrievable commitment of 
resources” while the environmental review was pending. 
Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1143. The one contract it entered into 
before the EA was finalized – the Project Partnership 
Agreement, which was signed with the Philadelphia Regional 
Port Authority on June 23, 2008 – expressly acknowledged 
that the Corps would “expeditiously construct the general 
navigation features . . . applying those procedures usually 
applied to Federal projects, pursuant to Federal laws, 
regulations, and policies.” In other words, construction was 
made contingent on a successful NEPA review. 
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procedures when assembling environmental reports, but also 
that they take a “hard look” at the environmental costs of the 
proposed action as compared to the contemplated benefits. 
See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 98 (1983) (“Congress, in enacting NEPA . . 
. . required [] that the agency take a ‘hard look’ at the 
environmental consequences before taking a major action.”); 
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978). The Corps provided 
the necessary “hard look” at the project’s costs and benefits, 
and at whether an additional SEIS was needed for the project, 
in the 2009 EA. Riverkeeper and New Jersey advance three 
reasons for why the agency’s review was not sufficient, none 
of which is convincing.  
 First, Riverkeeper argues the EA failed to adequately 
address the adverse impacts the project could cause on the 
shortnose sturgeon. The shortnose sturgeon was included in 
the federal Endangered Species list at least as far back as 
1996, meaning it bore that classification at the time the SEIS 
and EA were published. Some agencies and organizations had 
expressed concern during the comments period that the 
analysis of the shortnose sturgeon in the 1997 SEIS was no 
longer sufficient. New information about the species and its 
use of the Delaware River had become available, such that 
“the proposed deepening may affect shortnose sturgeon in a 
manner or to an extent not considered” previously.  
The EA contained no fewer than four separate sections 
on the shortnose sturgeon, including a comprehensive 
assessment of the species in an appended Essential Fish 
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Habitat Evaluation. The report acknowledged that recent 
surveys showed “a significant expansion in the number and 
distribution of shortnose sturgeon in the Delaware River 
appears likely,” but it also cited a 2005 study which found 
that “large aggregations of sturgeon do not exist in the 
blasting area.” Furthermore, it explained how blasting 
techniques could be honed to minimize harm to the species. 
The Corps drew on these analyses – as well as its findings in 
a Biological Assessment published for NMFS earlier that year 
– to conclude that adverse impacts to the shortnose sturgeon 
would be minimal.17
Riverkeeper also contends the EA did not give a hard 
look to the dangers confronting the Atlantic sturgeon. NMFS 
 The Corps’ conclusion was neither 
arbitrary nor capricious. 
                                                 
17 The Biological Assessment was prepared by the Corps in 
January 2009. In it, the Corps had concluded that any risks to 
shortnose sturgeon posed by the deepening project could be 
“minimize[d] and in some cases eliminate[d],” because “the 
majority of potential impacts would be related to the blasting 
activities . . . scheduled to take place in December and 
January of project Years 1 and 2.” NMFS endorsed the 
Corps’ findings in a Biological Opinion published in July 
2009. The Biological Opinion found: “[I]n its entirety, the 
proposed action is likely to result in direct physical effects . . . 
to no more than 57 shortnose sturgeon . . . . this number 
represents a very small percentage of the shortnose sturgeon 
population in the Delaware River . . . . [T]he proposed 
deepening project will not appreciably reduce the likelihood 
of survival . . . for this species . . . .”  
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designated the Atlantic sturgeon as a “candidate” for the 
Endangered Species list in 2006, and throughout the time at 
issue in this litigation, it retained that classification.18
The EA’s analysis of the Atlantic sturgeon was 
sufficient. The report contained two sections on “threatened 
and endangered species and other species of special concern,” 
each of which contained a sub-section on the Atlantic 
sturgeon. The sturgeon’s use of the Delaware River – from 
spawning, to hatching, to other migratory patterns – was 
analyzed in detail. Furthermore, every public comment about 
 
“Candidate” species receive no statutory protection under the 
Endangered Species Act, but their vulnerability makes them 
appropriate for consideration in a NEPA review.  
                                                 
18 On February 6, 2012, NMFS listed the New York Bight 
distinct population segment (“DPS”) of the Atlantic sturgeon 
as an Endangered Species. See Final Listing Rule for Gulf of 
Maine, New York Bight, and Chesapeake Bay Distinct 
Population Segments of the Atlantic Sturgeon in the 
Northeast Region, 77 Fed. Reg. 5880, 5909 (Feb. 6, 2012) (to 
be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 224). The New York Bight DPS 
includes sturgeon in the Delaware River. Id. at 5881, 5903, 
5912. Because NMFS’s endangerment listing post-dated the 
events in this litigation, it has no bearing on the quality of the 
EA. Nonetheless, we observe that it is unlikely the February 
2012 listing would change the EA’s conclusion that no 
additional SEIS was necessary for the project because the EA 
treated the Atlantic sturgeon as a species of “special 
concern,” given its “candidate” species listing at that time, 
and analyzed its vulnerability in several discussions.   
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the vulnerability of the species that Riverkeeper cites in its 
Brief was also addressed in the EA. See Riverkeeper Br. at 85 
(citing comments by NMFS, Prof. Dewayne Fox, and the 
Delaware River Basin Fish and Wildlife Management 
Cooperative). The Delaware River Basin Fish and Wildlife 
Management Cooperative filed a comment recommending the 
Corps “establish dredging and blasting windows that would 
result in the lowest probable impact to existing sturgeon 
populations of both Atlantic as well as shortnose.” The EA 
adopted this proposal: “All of these windows will be met 
during construction of the deepening project,” save for one, 
which was infeasible. Professor Dewayne Fox of Delaware 
State University advised the Corps to take into account “the 
large body of work . . . done primarily by both DSU and the 
Delaware Department of Fisheries and Wildlife” about the 
Atlantic sturgeon. The EA devoted three pages to the studies 
of Professor Fox. NMFS informed the Corps it would 
“recommend protective measures” for the Atlantic sturgeon. 
The Corps committed to using “environmental windows” and 
“[c]onstruction techniques” to “reduce the impacts of rock 
blasting on fish,” and to working collaboratively with NMFS 
during the project design phase.19
                                                 
19 Appellants draw our attention to a recent Ninth Circuit 
decision in which the court invalidated a supplemental EIS 
for, in part, failing to “provide baseline data for many of the 
species, and instead plan[ning] to conduct surveys and studies 
as part of its post-approval mitigation measures[.]” N. Plains 
Res. Council, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d 1067, 




Finally, New Jersey contends the EA’s analysis of 
potential water contamination was deficient. In two ways, 
New Jersey argues, the EA lacked the necessary data for a 
robust analysis. First, it did not include up-to-date sediment 
samples from “bend-widening areas” in the Delaware River, 
which are necessary to obtain “‘a worst case picture of 
contaminant concentrations that would potentially be in the 
dredged material.’” N.J. Reply Br. 19 (citing the SEIS). 
Second, New Jersey claims the EA omitted a “modified 
elutriate analysis,” which was important for predicting how 
dredged material, stored upstream, would impact surface 
water quality.   
Neither purported data shortcoming rises to the level 
of arbitrary or capricious action. The EA relied on a broad 
array of studies, surveys, and sediment samples to ground its 
analysis of the potential water contamination from the project. 
First, it relied on sediment samples evaluated in the SEIS, 
which New Jersey concedes included samples from bend-
widening areas. These had shown no bioaccumulation of any 
significance in the river’s sediment, and no potential for the 
                                                                                                             
inapposite. The report in Northern Plains was deficient 
because it sought to obtain baseline data, necessary for the 
agency’s approval of a project, from mitigation measures to 
be instituted after the project was underway. Id. at 1084. The 
agency put the cart before the horse. Here, the EA contained 
considerable baseline data on the Atlantic sturgeon, such as 
studies from 2003 through 2007, and relied on mitigation 
measures only to conclude the project could be deployed in a 
way that would avoid causing significant harm to the species. 
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deepening to increase the water’s toxicity. Second, the EA 
“incorporated . . . by reference” the modified elutriate 
analysis from the SEIS, which similarly concluded that 
“dredging and dredged material disposal operations would not 
significantly impact water quality within the Delaware 
River.” Third, the EA relied on two studies by the Corps in 
2003 and 2005, analyzing “[a] total of 45 sediment cores” 
from the main channel and concluding there was negligible 
contamination. Finally, the EA relied on 162 sediment 
samples collected by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration from intertidal and subtidal areas for a 2007 
report. These samples showed the 2004 oil spill had left no 
lingering effects and “baseline conditions (i.e., no spill-
associated service losses) [we]re reached in 14 months.” 
Altogether, this material provided the Corps a sufficient basis 
from which to analyze how the project would impact water 
contamination in the Delaware River and from which to draw 
well-reasoned, non-arbitrary conclusions.20
                                                 
20 New Jersey claims it flagged the need for updated sediment 
samples from bend-widening areas and for a modified 
elutriate analyses in its public comment from January 14, 
2009.  Accordingly, it claims the EA’s failure to include such 
data was indefensible, as demonstrated in the recent case of 
Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 661 F.3d 1147, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (holding it would have been arbitrary and capricious 
for the Corps to issue a FONSI that failed to address a 
comment raised by an expert about a threatened species, and 
remanding for factfinding on that issue). But New Jersey’s 
January 14 comment had not mentioned modified elutriate 
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IV.   
Riverkeeper contends the Corps’ decision to proceed 
with the deepening project violated the Clean Water Act.  
First, Riverkeeper argues it violated Section 401(a), which 
requires recipients of federal permits who release “discharge” 
in navigable waters to obtain “a certification from the State in 
which the discharge originates or will originate.” 33 U.S.C. § 
1341(a)(1). The Corps never secured water certifications from 
New Jersey or from Delaware for the project. Second, 
Riverkeeper contends the Corps’ actions ran afoul of Sections 
313 and 404(t), which obligate federal agencies to comply 
with state environmental regulations when engaging in 
dredging operations. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a); id. § 1344(t). After 
eight years of delay, Delaware denied the Corps two permits 
required by state law for users of subaqueous lands and 
wetlands in July 2009; nonetheless, the Corps decided to 
proceed.  In response to Riverkeeper’s challenges, the Corps 
contends it is entitled to two statutory exemptions codified at 
Sections 404(r) and 404(t) of the CWA. For the reasons 
stated, we hold that both exemptions attach.   
                                                                                                             
analysis. And while it called for updated sediment samples 
from bend-widening areas, the EA relied upon reports 
assembled in 2003, 2005 and 2007, all of which included 
updated sediment samples. See supra. The Corps’ judgment 
that these samples were sufficient to offer the agency a 




The Clean Water Act (“CWA”) was enacted in 1972 to 
“restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters.” Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 101(a), 86 Stat. 816 
(1972).  Under its principal provision, “the discharge of any 
pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.” 33 U.S.C. § 
1311(a). The “discharge of a pollutant” is defined as “any 
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point 
source,” see id. § 1362(12); “navigable waters” are defined as 
“waters of the United States, including the territorial seas,” id. 
§ 1362(7); and “pollutant” is defined as including “dredged 
spoil, . . . rock, sand, [and] cellar dirt,” id. § 1362(6). The 
Delaware River readily qualifies as a “navigable water” 
because it is a “relatively permanent . . . continuously flowing 
bod[y] of water forming geographic features that are 
described in ordinary parlance as . . . rivers,” Rapanos v. 
United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted); and dredging qualifies as the 
“discharge of a pollutant” because it results in the “addition” 
of “dredged spoil” to a navigable water. Under Section 
404(a), however, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers may 
“issue permits . . . for the discharge of dredged or fill material 
into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites.” See 
CWA § 404(a) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a)). The Corps 
“exercises the discretion of an enlightened despot” in issuing 
discharge permits, Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721, and considers a 
broad range of factors set forth in its regulations, see 33 
C.F.R. § 320.4.  But there is one statutory obligation 
incumbent upon the Corps. Before issuing a permit, it must 
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apply “guidelines developed by the Administrator [of the 
EPA], in conjunction with the Secretary [of the Army],” 
which prescribe a rigorous review of a project’s 
environmental costs. CWA § 404(b)(1) (codified at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1344(b)); 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 et seq.21
The Clean Water Act requires federal agencies and 
holders of federally-issued discharge permits to comply with 
state and local environmental laws in two pertinent ways. 
First, under Section 401(a), the Act requires holders of U.S. 
Army Corps permits, issued pursuant to Section 404, to 
obtain “certifications” from the states in which the discharge 
into navigable waters will occur. CWA § 401(a) (codified at 
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)) (“Any applicant for a Federal license 
or permit to conduct any activity . . . which may result in any 
discharge into the navigable waters, shall provide the 
licensing or permitting agency a certification from the State in 
which the discharge originates or will originate . . . that any 
such discharge will comply with the applicable provisions of 
[other sections of this title].”).  The state certification “shall 
become a condition of any Federal license or permit subject 
to the provisions of this section.” 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d). 
Second, under Sections 313 and 404(t), the Act requires 
federal departments and instrumentalities to comply with state 
   
                                                 
21 When the Corps seeks to undertake a project that will 
release discharge, it does not go through the formality of 
issuing a permit to itself. Instead, it follows “all applicable 
substantive legal requirements” under Section 404, including 




environmental laws when they engage in activities that emit 
pollutants into navigable waters. CWA § 313 (codified at 33 
U.S.C. § 1323(a)) (“Each department, agency, or 
instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches of the Federal Government . . . shall be subject to, 
and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local 
requirements . . . respecting the control and abatement of 
water pollution . . . .”); CWA § 404(t) (codified at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1344(t)) (“[Every federal] agency shall comply with such 
State or interstate requirements both substantive and 
procedural to control the discharge of dredged or fill material 
to the same extent that any person is subject to such 
requirements.”). 
But the Act also provides exceptions to the provisions 
cited, enacted as part of the Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. 
No. 97-217, 91 Stat. 1566.  As to the water certification 
requirement under Section 401(a), Section 404(r) creates an 
exemption for projects “specifically authorized” by Congress. 
See CWA § 404(r) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §1344(r)) (“The 
discharge of dredged or fill material as part of the 
construction of a Federal project specifically authorized by 
Congress . . . is not prohibited by or otherwise subject to 
regulation under this section . . . .”). As to the mandates to 
follow states’ environmental laws, codified at Sections 313 
and 404(t), the final sentence of Section 404(t) provides a 
partial waiver. See CWA § 404(t) (codified at 33. U.S.C. § 
1344(t)) (“This section shall not be construed as affecting or 
impairing the authority of the Secretary to maintain 
navigation.”); see also S. Rep. No. 95-370, at 68-69 (1977) 
(“[C]orps dredging activities are not exempt from State 
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pollution abatement requirements. . . . [But this] is neither 
intended nor expected to result in compromising the ability of 
the corps to maintain navigation.”). Before Section 404(t) was 
added in 1977, the CWA had included a provision, still in 
force, that similarly preserved the Corps’ authority to 
“maintain navigation.” See CWA § 511(a)(2) (codified at 33 
U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)) (“This chapter shall not be construed as . 
. . affecting or impairing the authority of the Secretary of the 
Army (A) to maintain navigation or (B) under the Act of 
March 3, 1899[.]”). 
B. 
The Corps asserts it was relieved of the need to obtain 
water certifications from New Jersey and Delaware under 
Section 401(a) of the CWA by virtue of the “congressionally 
authorized” exception under Section 404(r). Riverkeeper 
disagrees, but we find the Corps’ argument convincing.22
                                                 
22 Riverkeeper argued the Corps violated CWA § 401(a), and 
that CWA § 404(r) did not apply, at summary judgment in 
both district courts. New Jersey raises this claim for the first 
time on appeal. See N.J. Br. at 60. A party’s failure to raise an 
issue in district court typically results in forfeiture of the 
claim. Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters & 
Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1298 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding 
“[i]t is well established that failure to raise an issue in the 
district court constitutes a waiver of the argument” unless 
certain “extraordinary circumstances” exist). We need not 
resolve whether to consider the Section 401(a) claim as to 
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As an initial matter, we agree with the Corps that “all 
of the elements of section 404(r) have been satisfied” for the 
deepening project. Section 404(r) provides: 
The discharge of dredged or fill material as part 
of the construction of a Federal project 
specifically authorized by Congress . . . is not 
prohibited by or otherwise subject to regulation 
under this section . . . if information on the 
effects of such discharge, including 
consideration of the guidelines developed under 
subsection (b)(1) of this section, is included in 
an environmental impact statement for such 
project pursuant to the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 [42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 et seq.] 
and such environmental impact statement has 
been submitted to Congress before the actual 
discharge of dredged or fill material in 
connection with the construction of such project 
and prior to either authorization of such project 
or an appropriation of funds for such 
construction. 
33 U.S.C. § 1344(r). Accordingly, to trigger Section 404(r), 
there must be a federal project specifically authorized by 
Congress. The deepening project unquestionably qualifies, as 
Congress clearly authorized it in the Water Resources 
Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-580, § 101(6), 
                                                                                                             
New Jersey because we find it to lack merit, when evaluated 
as to Riverkeeper. 
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106 Stat. 4797, 4802 (“[T]he following projects for water 
resources development and conservation and other purposes 
are authorized to be carried out by the Secretary . . . . The 
project for navigation, Delaware River Mainstem and 
Channel Deepening, Delaware, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania: Report of the Chief of Engineers, dated June 
29, 1992, at a total cost of $294,931,000, with an estimated 
Federal cost of $195,767,000 . . . .”). Section 404(r) also 
requires that “information on the effects of [the project], 
including consideration of the guidelines developed under 
subsection (b)(1)” be “included in an environmental impact 
statement . . . submitted to Congress before the actual 
discharge of dredged or fill material . . . and prior to either 
authorization of such project or an appropriation of funds for 
such construction.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(r). This prerequisite 
was met. The Corps transmitted an EIS to Congress in June 
1992 that had been prepared pursuant to NEPA and that 
included, as Section 404(r) directs, a “consideration of the 
guidelines developed under subsection (b)(1).” The 
transmission occurred five months before Congress 
authorized the project or appropriated funds, see WRDA, 106 
Stat. at 4797 (showing a date passage of October 31, 1992), 
and years before any “actual discharge” occurred. 
 Nonetheless, Riverkeeper contends Section 404(r) 
does not apply for two reasons. The first is that the 1992 EIS 
was incomplete because it lacked a Record of Decision. The 
Record of Decision was issued in December 1992, two 
months after the WRDA was enacted. But this is of no 
moment. Section 404(r) mandates that “[an] environmental 
impact statement . . . [prepared] pursuant to the National 
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Environmental Policy Act” be provided to Congress and that 
it “includ[e] consideration of the guidelines developed under 
subsection (b)(1)”; it never mentions a Record of Decision. 
The absence of a Record of Decision in the congressional 
submission violates no statutory command. Furthermore, the 
purpose of Section 404(r) is for Congress to receive sufficient 
information in order to make an informed judgment about 
whether to authorize a federal project. In cases like this, 
where an EIS is produced after a full-fledged notice and 
comment process, bears the title of “final” impact study, and 
is transmitted to Congress with an explicit request for a 
Section 404(r) exemption, that purpose has been achieved.23
                                                 
23 The recent case of Board of Mississippi Levee 
Commissioners v. EPA, 674 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2012) is 
consistent with our holding. In that case, the Fifth Circuit held 
that Section 404(r) of the CWA had not been triggered when 
a report provided to Congress lacked, among other things, a 
Record of Decision. The absence of a Record of Decision was 
one factor among several that persuaded the court to find the 
report had not been an agency’s “final EIS.” In addition to the 
lack of a Record of Decision, the agency’s transmittal letter to 
Congress plainly stated the report was not final.  Id. at 414-
15. Four months after the report was transmitted to Congress, 
the Chief of Engineers prepared a “final report” for the same 
project. Id. at 415. And because the original report sent to 
Congress was not in the record, the court could not determine 
whether it was labeled a “final” EIS. The Fifth Circuit held 
these factors collectively proved the document provided to 




Second, Riverkeeper contends the SEIS invalidated 
whatever exemption had been attained by virtue of the EIS. 
Riverkeeper claims the SEIS stands as proof that by 1997, the 
deepening project had changed to such an extent and new 
information had become available to such a degree, that 
Congress’s 1992 statutory authorization was no longer 
binding. But nothing in the text of Section 404(r) suggests 
that once the exemption attached, it lapses. The plain 
language of the statute states that when Congress 
“specifically authorizes” a federal project, following its 
consideration of an EIS, the exemption is triggered. 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1344(r). There is no requirement that the agency submit 
supplemental NEPA reports so Congress can reauthorize the 
venture. Furthermore, the SEIS’s central findings were that 
despite the developments between 1992 and 1997 – e.g., 
modifications to the project, new scientific information that 
became available – the conclusions in the EIS still applied. 
The SEIS stated: “[R]efinements to the authorized plan that 
were recommended in the 1992 Interim Feasibility Report . . . 
. did not alter the environmental impacts that were presented 
in the Final Environmental Impact Statement” and the project 
still “compl[ied] with the 404(b)(1) guidelines.”  There was 
no need to solicit reauthorization from Congress because the 
project had not changed in a material way. 
                                                                                                             
404(r) had not been triggered. Id. at 419. Here, the EIS 
transmitted to Congress in June 1992 was entitled “Final 
Interim Feasibility Report,” was produced after a full notice 
and comment process, and was sent with a transmittal letter 
requesting the Section 404(r) exemption.  
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In sum, Section 404(r) of the CWA was triggered in 
1992 and did not lapse by virtue of the Corps’ subsequent 
NEPA analyses. The Corps was relieved of the federal 
permitting requirement under Section 404, see 33 C.F.R. § 
323.4(d) (explaining that “[f]ederal projects which qualify 
under the criteria in section 404(r) of the CWA are exempt 
from section 404 permit requirements”), as well as from the 
water certification requirement under Section 401(a), see 33 
U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (stating the certification mandate attaches 
to “applicant[s] for a Federal license or permit to conduct any 
activity”). The fact that the Corps attempted to work 
collaboratively with New Jersey and Delaware for several 
years does not undermine its lawful reliance on the Section 
404(r) exemption.  
C. 
 The Corps contends it was relieved of Sections 313 
and 404(t) of the Clean Water Act, which required it to obtain 
special Delaware permits, because it was entitled to a 
statutory exemption codified at Section 404(t). We afford 
Skidmore deference to the Corps’ invocation of Section 404(t) 
and find its interpretation of the statute reasonable. We also 
find the Corps was neither arbitrary nor capricious in deciding 
to invoke Section 404(t). 
The Delaware Subaqueous Lands Act “empower[s] the 
Secretary to deal with or dispose of interest in public 
subaqueous lands.” 7 Del. Code Ann. tit. 7, § 7201. Under 
that authority, DNREC promulgated regulations instructing 
that “[n]o . . . project which may potentially impact the public 
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interest in the use of tidal or navigable waters [or] contribute 
to water pollution . . . shall be undertaken on public or private 
subaqueous lands unless approval has been obtained from the 
Department.” 7 Del. Admin. Code § 7504-2.7. The Delaware 
Wetlands Act provides that “[a]ny activity on the wetlands 
requires a permit from [DNREC].” 7 Del. Code Ann. tit. 7, § 
6604(a). The word “activity” is defined to include dredging 
operations. Id. § 6603. Both permit requirements extend to 
the deepening project because it calls for the disposal of 
dredged material at three subaqueous land-sites in Delaware 
and for a wetlands restoration project in Delaware.24
                                                 
24 The record reveals some confusion as to whether the 
wetlands permit was necessary and as to whether the Corps’ 
2001 application was made pursuant to the Wetlands Act or 
solely the Subaqueous Lands Act. Neither party has raised 
this issue on appeal. We assume both were required and that 
the Corps applied for both.   
 
It is also worth noting the permits mandated by the 
Subaqueous Lands and Wetlands Acts were not affected by 
the exemption codified at Section 404(r). Section 404(r) 
relieves projects “specially authorized” by Congress from the 
permitting requirements in Section 404. One of those 
requirements, codified at Section 401(a), is to obtain a state 
water certification. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). But for a water 
certification to fall under Section 401(a), it must be issued by 
a state body operating a “permit program” that regulates 
“discharges into navigable waters” and that has been 
approved by the EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).  The Delaware 
Subaqueous Lands and Wetlands Acts create permit programs 
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The Corps applied for subaqueous lands and wetlands 
permits in 2001. For eight years, Delaware stalled on its 
application. In light of Sections 313 and 404(t) of the CWA, 
which obligate federal agencies to follow states’ 
environmental laws, the Corps was at an impasse. 
Accordingly, it invoked the exemption set forth in Section 
404(t) in the spring of 2009. That provision provides: “This 
section shall not be construed as affecting or impairing the 
authority of the Secretary to maintain navigation.”  CWA 
§404(t) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1344(t)). On April 30, 2009, 
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works signed a 
Memorandum of Record declaring the “failure to construct 
the 45’ Project as authorized by Congress in 1992 has . . . 
impaired the Secretary of the Army’s authority to maintain 
navigation . . . .” The Assistant Secretary was “direct[ing] the 
Corps to proceed with construction of the project.” The 
Memorandum of Record cited Section 404(t) of the CWA as 
the authoritative basis for its action.   
                                                                                                             
for the use of subaqueous lands and wetlands, neither of 
which is approved by the EPA under § 1342.  Accordingly, 
the Delaware Subaqueous Lands and Wetlands Acts are 
“other state requirements” that do not fall under Section 
404(r) and that holders of federally-issued permits are 
required to follow. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(d) (“Federal 
projects which qualify under the criteria contained in section 
404(r) of the CWA are exempt from section 404 permit 
requirements, but may be subject to other State and Federal 
requirements.”).   
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The Corps’ invocation of Section 404(t) was entitled to 
Skidmore deference. In cases involving an agency’s legal 
interpretation of a statute, the amount of deference afforded is 
governed by the Chevron framework. First, a court asks 
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question 
at issue.” Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). “If the intent of Congress is clear, 
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the 
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress.” Id. at 842-43. Second, a court asks 
whether, if the statute is ambiguous, the agency has rendered 
“a permissible construction.” Id. at 843. A court is more 
likely to find the agency’s interpretation permissible if there 
is a “complex and highly technical regulatory program,” 
Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp. v. Thompson, 297 F.3d 
273, 282 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations and quotation marks 
omitted), or if the agency has employed formal procedures, 
such as notice and comment rulemaking, see Christensen v. 
Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). If the court declines 
to extend Chevron deference, it may nonetheless extend a 
lesser degree deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 
U.S. 134 (1944).  
Before resorting to Skidmore deference, we observe 
that it is likely the phrase “maintain navigation” encompasses 
activities, such as the deepening project, that improve a body 
of water in order to keep navigation levels steady in light of 
changes to commercial markets, technology, and 
environmental conditions. While neither “maintain 
navigation” nor its component words are explicitly defined in 
the Clean Water Act, there is no evidence that Congress 
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intended the phrase to encompass only those activities that 
preserve bodies of water as they existed in 1977, when the 
statutory language was inserted. See Clean Water Act of 
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566. Arguably, such a 
reading would be irrational. Given that navigation evolves 
over time, limiting the Corps to preserving rivers as they were 
in 1977 could have the counter-productive effect of 
preventing it from “maintaining” ship traffic. The dictionary 
definitions also suggest the phrase reaches improvement 
projects. “Maintain” is defined as “to keep in an existing state 
(as of repair, efficiency or validity): preserve from failure or 
decline,” and “navigation” as “ship traffic or commerce.” See 
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2005). 
These are capacious definitions; preserving “ship traffic” 
from “failure or decline” could call for a wide range of 
activities, including repairs, modifications, and 
improvements.  
Nonetheless, were we to find the statutory text 
ambiguous, Skidmore deference would be warranted and 
would support the Corps’ action.25
                                                 
25 We need not decide whether Chevron deference should 
attach. Riverkeeper contends it should not, given the 
informality of the agency’s action. Namely, it points out that 
the Corps did not engage in notice and comment rulemaking 
when it invoked Section 404(t), but acted on the basis of a 
Memorandum of Record. See United States v. Mead Corp., 
533 U.S. 218, 230-31 (2001) (holding “the want of” notice 
and comment procedures often compels in favor of not 
deferring to the agency). We need not settle this debate. At 
  A court will afford 
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Skidmore deference upon consideration of “the thoroughness 
evident in [an agency’s] consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control.” Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 
140.  The most important considerations are whether the 
agency’s interpretation “is consistent and contemporaneous 
with other pronouncements of the agency and whether it is 
reasonable given the language and purpose of the Act.” 
Cleary ex. rel. Cleary v. Waldman, 167 F.3d 801, 808 (3d Cir. 
1999). The Corps’ interpretation of Section 404(t) is entitled 
to deference under these standards. Its reading did not 
contradict any of the agency’s prior statements about Section 
404(t) – the Corps had only once before invoked the 
exception, and in a context different from but not in conflict 
with that here. See In re Operation of Mo. River Sys. Litig., 
418 F.3d at 915 (affirming the Corps’ invocation of Section 
404(t) to release water from a reservoir and support 
downstream navigation in the Missouri River). The 
interpretation also was reasonable “given the language and 
purpose” of the statute, because the view that “maintain 
navigation” extends to activities necessary to maintain current 
levels of ship traffic, which is what the EA forecasted the 
project would do by enabling shippers to employ a larger 
vessel fleet, see supra note 5, is consistent with the plain 
meaning of “maintain” – i.e., to “preserve from failure or 
                                                                                                             
the least, Skidmore deference is due, and is sufficient to 




decline.” Finally, the canon that “[w]aivers of immunity must 
be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign,” see U.S. Dep’t 
of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 615 (1992) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted), supports the Corps’ 
interpretation. Allowing “maintain navigation” to encompass 
the deepening project would have the effect of limiting the 
federal government’s waiver of sovereign immunity in the 
first part of Section 404(t). 
Riverkeeper contends Skidmore deference is improper. 
First, it argues that Congress intended Section 404(t)’s 
“maintain navigation” authority to be “linked with the Corps’ 
historical authorities under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 
1899 . . . . to maintain navigation by preventing the 
obstruction of navigable waterways.” Riverkeeper Br. at 47. 
In other words, Congress only intended for “maintain 
navigation” to protect the Corps’ mandate to do things it did 
in 1899 – such as removing physical blockages from rivers or 
preventing activities that would impede the flow of 
waterborne commerce. The statutory language, however, 
suggests the opposite. Congress did not include a reference to 
the Rivers and Harbors Act in the text of Section 404(t) as it 
had done when it codified Section 511 in 1972. Compare 
CWA § 404(t) (“This section shall not be construed as 
affecting or impairing the authority of the Secretary to 
maintain navigation.”), with CWA § 511(a)(2) (“This chapter 
shall not be construed as . . . affecting or impairing the 
authority of the Secretary of the Army (A) to maintain 
navigation or (B) under the Act of March 3, 1899[.]”). This 
shows that if anything, Congress intended Section 404(t) to 
reach more broadly than the programs the Corps managed in 
62 
 
1899 and to encompass the full scope of the Corps’ activities 
in 1977.26
                                                 
26 Furthermore, the Corps had significantly broader authority 
in 1899 than Riverkeeper acknowledges. The Rivers and 
Harbors Act contains twenty-eight pages of appropriations to 
the Corps for conducting “improvement” projects in the 
nation’s waterways.  See Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, ch. 
425, 30 Stat. 1121, 1121-1149 (“Be it enacted . . . [t]hat the 
following sums of money be, and are hereby, appropriated . . . 
to be expended under the direction of the Secretary of War 
and the supervision of the Chief of Engineers, for the 
construction, completion, repair, and preservation of the 
public works hereinafter named: Improving Moosabec Bar, 
Maine: Completing improvement, eleven thousand dollars. . . 
. For improvement of the Buffalo entrance to Erie Basic and 
Black Rock Harbor, New York . . . . Improving New York 
Harbor, New York . . . by a deep channel, two thousand feet 
wide and forty feet deep from the Narrows . . . one million 
dollars . . . Improving Port Chester Harbor, New York: 
Twenty-five thousand dollars, to be expended in enlargening 
the channel below and up to Town Dock to a depth of twenty 
feet . . . . Improving the outer bar, Brunswick Georgie: C.P. 
Goodyear, the contractor with the Government of the United 
States, to deepen the outer bar of Brunswick . . . . Improving 
harbor at Pensacola, Florida: . . . seventy thousand dollars . . . 
to be used toward securing a channel depth of thirty feet . . . . 
Improving harbor at Mobile Alabama: . . . with the view of 
ultimately securing a channel twenty-three feet deep and one 




Finding the Corps’ interpretation of Section 404(t) 
worthy of deference under Skidmore, our final step is to 
determine whether the agency’s invocation of the exemption 
was arbitrary or capricious. See 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A); Robert 
Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp., 297 F.3d at 284. It was neither. 
After studying commerce patterns in the Delaware River for 
two decades and publishing three extensive reports, in 1992, 
1997, and 2009, the Corps concluded a five foot deepening 
project was necessary to preserve the current flow of 
navigation in the Delaware River. As the EA put it, this 
project was essential to “improve the economic efficiency of 
ships moving through the Delaware ports,” help shippers 
“more efficiently apportion operating costs,” and “allow 
current dry bulk and container vessels to carry more cargo as 
well as allow a fleet shift in the charger dry bulk market.” The 
Corps’ consideration of the issue was “thorough” and its 
determination was reasonable. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
Meanwhile, Delaware had sat on its permit application for 
eight years and, in December 2008, told the Corps it would 
need to submit an entirely new application. Given that the 
first phase of the project was scheduled, as of April 2009, to 
begin in August 2009, the Corps was warranted in invoking 
                                                                                                             
Ship Channel . . . by dredging or otherwise . . . . Deepening 
the channel from Galveston Harbor to Texas City, Texas . . . 
.” (emphases added)).  Accordingly, even if Sections 511 or 
404(t) of the CWA circumscribed the Corps’ “maintain 
navigation” authority to its historical authorities in 1899, the 
latter included the execution of improvement and channel 
deepening projects.   
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the exception to save the project from postponement or 
indefinite delay. 
V. 
New Jersey contends the Corps acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously under the Coastal Zone Management Act when it 
decided, as memorialized in a Memorandum of Record issued 
on November 9, 2009, to proceed with the project without 
providing supplemental consistency determinations to 
Delaware or New Jersey. Because “significant new 
information” had become available since the Corps submitted 
its initial CZMA determinations in 1997, New Jersey 
contends, supplemental determinations were required. 
According to New Jersey, the Corps’ conclusion to the 
contrary was arbitrary and capricious because it was 
grounded in the procedurally and substantively flawed EA.  
A. 
 The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 was 
enacted “to preserve, protect, develop, and where possible, to 
restore or enhance, the resources of the Nation’s coastal zone 
for this and succeeding generations,” and to “encourage and 
assist the states to exercise effectively their responsibilities in 
the coastal zone through the development and implementation 
of management programs to achieve wise use of the land and 
water resources of the coastal zone[.]” 16 U.S.C. § 1452(1), 
(2). States’ “management programs” must provide for “the 
protection of natural resources,”  as well as “improved 
coordination between State and Federal coastal zone 
65 
 
management agencies.” Id. § 1452(2)(A), (J).  Federal 
agencies conducting activities “within or outside the coastal 
zone” are required to provide the relevant state(s) with a 
“determination” that the activity “shall be carried out in a 
manner which is consistent to the maximum extent 
practicable with the enforceable policies of approved State 
management programs.” Id. § 1456(c)(1)(A), (C). The 
state(s), in turn, must either concur with or object to the 
federal agency’s determination. 15 C.F.R. § 930.41(a). A 
state “cannot unilaterally place an expiration date on its 
concurrence.” Id. § 930.41(d).  Moreover, even if a state 
objects, the federal agency can proceed over the state’s 
objection if it “conclude[s] that its proposed action is fully 
consistent with the enforceable policies of the management 
program.” Id. § 930.43(d)(2). 
The CZMA regulations require federal agencies to 
supplement their consistency determinations if “the proposed 
activity will affects any coastal use or resource substantially 
different than originally described.” Id. § 930.46(a). 
“Substantially different” effects are “reasonably forseeable,” 
and thereby warrant a supplemental determination, if: (1) the 
agency “makes substantial changes in the proposed activity 
that are relevant to the manageable program enforceable 
policies”; or (2) there are “significant new circumstances or 
information relevant to the proposed activity and [its] effect 
on any coastal use or resources.” Id. § 930.46(a)(1), (2).  
B. 
The Corps’ conclusion in the Memorandum of Record 
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that it need not provide supplemental consistency 
determinations to either state under the CZMA was 
reasonable. Federal agencies are required to submit 
supplemental determinations in either of two instances: if the 
agency makes “substantial changes in the proposed activity,” 
or if “significant new circumstances or information relevant 
to the proposed activity and [its] effect on any coastal use or 
resource” arise. Id. § 930.46(a)(1), (2). Relying on the EA, 
the Corps concluded neither situation was present. With 
respect to “substantial changes” to the project, the 
Memorandum of Record identified three alterations that had 
been made since 1997, when the original CZMA consistency 
determinations were transmitted: (i) four disposal sites 
identified in the SEIS had been eliminated; (ii) sand would 
now be deposited directly onto Broadkill Beach, rather than 
initially stockpiled offshore; and (iii) a planned beneficial use 
site at Egg Point Island was no longer needed. None of these 
changes were “substantial,” the Corps determined, because 
the 2009 EA had found that none would cause serious 
impacts to the environment. With respect to “significant new 
circumstances or information,” the Memorandum of Record 
noted both the oil spill of 2004 and the recent surveys 
showing an expansion of the shortnose sturgeon in the region. 
But again, relying on the EA and a 2009 Biological 
Assessment the agency prepared for NMFS, the Corps 
concluded neither development was “significant” because 
neither would cause adverse environmental consequences not 
anticipated in the SEIS. The Corps was justified in relying on 
these recent and thorough reports. See supra. The agency’s 
conclusion that 15 C.F.R. § 930.46(a) had been satisfied, and 
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that no supplemental consistency determinations were 
required, was neither arbitrary nor capricious. 
VI. 
For over twenty years, the Corps has devoted 
substantial efforts to evaluating the proposed five foot 
deepening project for the Delaware River. It has published 
three comprehensive NEPA reports, received multiple rounds 
of public comments, and had immeasurable communications 
with the relevant state and federal agencies. Its decision in 
2009 to proceed with the project was consistent with NEPA, 
the CWA, and the CZMA. Accordingly, we will affirm the 
judgments of the District Courts of New Jersey and Delaware. 
